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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how firms are organized in the U.S. hotel management industry. For most hotel brands, 
properties with intermediate room occupancy rates are relatively more likely to be managed by company 
employees rather than by independent franchisees. Properties with the lowest and the highest occupancy rates 
tend to be managed by franchisees, at arm's length from the hotel chain. This variation in organizational form is 
consistent with a model in which the incentives embodied in management contracts vary with property-level 
productivity. We infer that most hotel chains franchise low productivity relationships to keep property-level 
fixed costs low and franchise the most productive relationships to create high-powered incentives for 
franchisees. Franchisees of high-productivity properties work harder than the managers of both chain-managed 
properties and low-productivity franchises because the performance incentives in franchise contracts are 
proportional to hotel revenues and complement the incentives arising from having control over the property. 
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1 Introduction
In the U.S. hotel industry, 30% of hotel properties are managed by hotel chain employees and
70% are managed by franchisees. Most hotel brands franchise management of some properties
while managing other properties themselves, with some brands opting to franchise more often than
others. This paper examines these organizational form choices, analyzing data from over 9, 000 hotel
properties affiliated with 38 different hotel brands. We report a new empirical finding: within a
hotel brand, hotel properties with either low or high occupancy rates are more likely to be managed
by franchisees (outsourced), while properties with intermediate occupancy rates are more likely to
be managed by company employees (vertically integrated).
Figure (1) controls for hotel chain and property location and shows the share of hotel properties
that are chain managed in each decile of the occupancy rate distribution. The share of chain
managed hotels in a brand is increasing with occupancy decile up to the seventh decile, in which
just under 40% of properties are chain managed. The share of chain managed hotels falls in each
successive higher-occupancy decile.
Figure 1: The Share of Chain-Managed Properties, by Occupancy Rate Decile
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In choosing whether to operate a given hotel property at arm’s length or in-house, hotel brands
face the classic ”make or buy” decision at the heart of theory of the firm that started with Coase
(1937). Hotel management requires relationship-specific investments from a property-level manager
and from a brand-level chain headquarters. The firm headquarters specifies the services to be
offered by the manager—either an independent franchisee or a chain employee—and also provides
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them with an operating system, brand identity, and support (International Franchise Association,
2018). The manager runs the property on a day-to-day basis and is responsible for all aspects
of the guests’ stay. When contracts between the headquarters and manager are incomplete, both
parties may face inefficiently weak incentives to invest in the relationship. Against this backdrop,
the headquarters choice of whether to make or buy the required management services can shape
both parties incentives and mitigate the incomplete contracting problem.
Accordingly, this paper draws on two theories of the firm to analyze hotel organizational form
choice. First, in property rights theory, organizational form determines who retains the residual
value of the relationship if it breaks down, and thereby determines who has relatively stronger ex
ante incentives to invest.1 This theory generates a tradeoff between inputs from the firm and from
the supplier. In a vertically integrated relationship, the firm retains control and underinvests less
in the relationship, but this exacerbates underinvestment by the supplier. Due to this tradeoff,
vertical integration is relatively efficient when the headquarters’ input is used more intensively in
production, and outsourcing is efficient otherwise.
Second, a separate strand of the literature, on managerial agency, examines how performance
incentives—that is, enforceable ex ante commitments to reward costly effort via state-contingent
payments—can mitigate an agent’s underinvestment (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brickley and Dark,
1987). A supplier’s incentives to exert effort are greater when his ex ante claims on the relationship
proceeds are larger. The firm’s decision to offer such incentives is often related to its organizational
form choice. For firm employees, performance incentives take the form of bonuses. For third-party
contractors, outsourcing (franchising, in our setting) can allow the firm to extract all the relationship
surplus upfront and make the supplier the residual claimant of all relationship proceeds; thus ”selling
the project to the agent” to eliminate agency problems.
We present a model where each hotel chain headquarters is an upstream firm that derives
market power from a trade name and organizes each property in order to maximize its own payoffs,
following previous studies of the hotel industry (Lafontaine, 1992). The hotel chain takes both
incentives mechanisms into account. While franchising incurs lower fixed costs, it weakens the
headquarters’ own incentives to invest in the relationship and increases those of the supplier, by the
usual logic of property rights models. In addition, the headquarters can offer explicit performance
incentives to each property manager.
1Much of the existing empirical literature on outsourcing decisions draws from the property rights theory of the
firm and, in particular, from Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
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Critically, we assume there is exogenous variation in hotel property-level productivity.2 In line
with the recent literature in international economics on productivity and supplier-firm relationships,
productivity then shapes the tradeoffs at the heart of the headquarters organizational decisions.3
In particular, the model predicts that the hotel headquarters will sort its properties by produc-
tivity into vertically integrated and non-integrated relationships. For low-productivity relationships,
hotel chains franchise primarily because it incurs lower fixed costs. This benefit dominates invest-
ment incentives considerations because low productivity reduces both the potential efficiency loss
from depriving the headquarters of residual control rights and the potential efficiency gain from
providing stronger performance incentives for the supplier.
This tradeoff changes as productivity increases. When production of hotel services is at least
moderately intensive in the headquarters investment, the potential efficiency gains from allocating
residual control rights to the headquarters—via vertical integration—increase rapidly with produc-
tivity. As a result, at intermediate levels of productivity, these efficiency gains outweigh both the
fixed cost advantage of franchising and the costs of underinvestment by the supplier, and vertical
integration is preferred.
The tradeoffs again change as productivity increases further. For high productivity properties
the hotel chain chooses to franchise management because it creates the highest powered incentives
for suppliers. The model reveals that reducing the supplier’s fear of hold up and strengthening her
residual claims on relationship proceeds enhance her investment incentives in a mutually reinforcing
way: mitigating the franchisee’s concerns about future holdup enhances the marginal return on the
inputs targeted by performance incentives. The associated efficiency gains outweigh the losses from
lower headquarters investment in a franchised property due to headquarters own lack of residual
control.
To underscore the importance of these complementarities, we show that a version of the model
without performance incentives—in essence, a simple property rights model—predicts that the
efficiency gains from allocating residual control rights to the headquarters (whose investment is as-
2The existence of persistent productivity heterogeneity is a well-established empirical fact, both within industries
(Ravenscraft, 1983; Schmalensee, 1985; Syverson, 2011; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2010) and within multi-unit firms
(Shelton, 1967; Darr et al., 1995; Griffith et al., 2006).
3As evidenced by the hotel industry (Kalnins, 2004 and 2006), and at the product level in papers in the interna-
tional trade literature (Antras, 2003; Yeaple, 2006; Nunn and Trefler, 2008), there is often substantial variation in
the organizational form governing the transaction of narrowly defined products or services. Following Melitz’s 2003
study of firm productivity and exporting behaviour, the international economics literature has explored in depth
how productivity shapes firms organizational choices vis-a-vis suppliers. Antras and Helpman (2004) demonstrates
how heterogeneous firms can sort (by productivity) into importers and non-importers and into vertically integrated
and non-integrated relationships. We use a simple version of this model as our starting point for the model in this
paper. We then include performance incentives similar to Grossman and Helpman (2004).
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sumed to be more important) increase monotonically with productivity. As a result, the probability
of vertical integration increases monotonically with productivity—in contrast to the inverted-U re-
lationship that emerges when we allow the firm to include performance incentives.
How do the data square with the predictions of the model? Following prior empirical studies of
the hotel industry, we measure property productivity using occupancy rate (Butters, 2016), defined
as room nights sold divided by room nights available. As shown in Figure 1, for many hotel brands,
low- and high-productivity properties are franchised, while intermediate-productivity properties are
vertically integrated. Through more formal econometric work, we confirm that the non-monotonic
relationship between the occupancy rate and the likelihood of vertical integration obtains for hotel
brands within the economy hotel tier (e.g., Econolodge), mid-scale tier (e.g., Holiday Inn), and
upscale tier (e.g., Courtyard).
A simple property rights model that includes ownership incentives but not performance in-
centives cannot explain the non-monotonic relationship. The data are consistent with the model
presented here, where outsourcing includes performance incentives that are incentive compatible
with maximal supplier effort only at high productivity levels. This fits with the hotel setting, where
typical franchising contract creates performance incentives for a franchisee to exert maximum ef-
fort only when property revenues are high—that is, in high occupancy rate properties. Contracts
usually include a fixed fee to be paid by the franchisee and then a revenue sharing agreement under
which the franchisee retains a share of revenues. Lafontaine (1992) notes that this share is typically
fixed across all properties within a brand. Because properties vary in occupancy rate, retaining
a constant share of revenues leads to potentially very different payoffs to hotel managers.4 We
conclude that residual control rights and fear of holdup are important but not exclusive determi-
nants of organizational choices in this industry; revenue-sharing performance incentives—as well as
complementarity between the two incentives mechanisms—appear empirically relevant as well.
Recent work including Legros and Newman (2012) has shown that organizational form can be
influenced by a variety of factors, some of which could be correlated with productivity, output, and
occupancy rate.5 To address the associated endogeneity issues in our setting, our primary empirical
4While franchising contracts specify how revenues are to be shared, the contract remains incomplete even for high
productivity relationships because it is impractical to write an enforceable contract governing all actions that affect
the level of revenues in all relevant states of the world. For example, the chain can encroach on a property’s territory
by operating nearby competing properties (Kalnins, 2004). On the other side of the agreement, the franchisee sets
property-level prices and is unlikely to consider the external impact on other properties owned by the chain (Kalnins,
2016).
5Legros and Newman (2012) model relationship productivity heterogeneity as a result of variation in the endoge-
nously determined market price. In their model, vertical integration improves coordination and increase relationship
output but also imposes additional costs, and this organizational form is preferred at intermediate levels of prices.
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specification controls for metropolitan area fixed effects and brand fixed effects. In addition, we
show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between occupancy rate and organizational form
over time when controlling for property fixed effects and time fixed effects. For those hotels that
switch from being franchised to chain managed or vice versa, franchising is more likely during time
periods of low and high relative occupancy.
While the existing literature has analysed variation in organization form across firms and across
geographic areas, we believe that this is the first empirical analysis of a franchise-intensive industry’s
organizational heterogeneity within brands and within narrowly defined geographic areas.6 By
controlling for both brand effects and metropolitan area effects, our empirical analysis controls for
determinants of organizational form that have already been explored relatively intensively by the
existing literature. Thus, the paper examines organizational heterogeneity that has so far received
little attention. It sheds new light on how various incentives mechanisms jointly shape organizational
form—in ways that are, at times, complementary.
These contributions are made possible by the fact that a hotel chain’s property-level ”forward
integration” decision about how to organize hotel management yields data for many similar supplier
relationships for each brand and for each metropolitan area. We assume that organizational choices
reflect the chain’s wish to maximize its own payoffs from each property, and the chain’s payoffs
are determined by each party’s inputs, which are, in turn, shaped by the incentives of the chosen
organizational form. This logic allows us to infer the interplay of each party’s incentives at different
property productivity levels, and assess the roles of various incentives mechanisms embodied in
organizational form choice.
We also assess how taxes affect organizational choices. Most hotel chains in the data have prop-
erties distributed across US states, and corporate tax rates vary across states. The model predicts
that the productivity range for which chain management is relatively preferred over outsourcing is
shifted up and widened at higher rates of tax. Using state tax data, we confirm that the probability
a property is chain managed is greatest at higher occupancy rates in states with high marginal
6Lafontaine and coauthors have conducted extensive empirical work on variation across firms in the firm-level
propensity to franchise in hotels and other franchise-intensive industries (Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine and Bhat-
tacharyya, 1995; Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005). Other studies find evidence that the
average propensity to outsource in this industry is, for example, positively related to distance from HQ (Brickley and
Dark, 1987) and negatively related to property size and the local concentration of same-brand properties (Kehoe,
1996). Our study also relates to two empirical papers about the ”make or buy” decision that also explore general
propositions from property rights models of firm boundaries. Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2010)’s model varies the
relative technological intensities of the inputs provided by the buyer and different suppliers. Second, Feenstra and
Hanson’s 2005 model of Chinese export processing shows that control over inputs is more likely to be allocated to
the supplier when the relationship specificity of human capital is low. They use variation in observed organizational
forms across different Chinese provinces to estimate variation in human capital relationship-specificity.
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corporate tax rates for the midscale and economy quality tier brands.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model of organizational form choice.
Section 3 describes the data used in the study. Section 4 documents the key empirical relationships
and relates them to the predictions from the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Organizational Form
We present a partial equilibrium model of a single firm-supplier organizational form choice where
there is heterogeneity in firm-supplier relationship productivity and incomplete contracting. The
starting point for the model is a simplified version of Antras and Helpman (2004) (AH). As in
their paper, all parties are risk neutral and the supply of local suppliers is assumed to be infinitely
elastic.7 We use the terminology H for the firm and S for the supplier in the model to illustrate
its general nature. In our empirical application, HQ is the hotel chain, and S is a franchisee or
chain-employed manager.
The environment
The firm headquarters (H) incurs a fixed market entry cost fE, matches with a potential supplier (S),
and makes a productivity draw, θ, from a known distribution F (θ). H then chooses an organizational
form—either vertical integration (V ) with the supplier or outsourcing (O), in which HQ and S
remain independent. Outsourcing entails a fixed cost for H of fO. The fixed cost to H of vertical
integration is supplier-specific, stochastic, and denoted by fV , drawn from a known distribution
H(fV ). On average, vertical integration entails higher fixed costs, that is, E(fV ) > fO.
Under both V and O, H and S must each produce relationship-specific inputs to generate output.
The inputs are xH and xS, respectively, and their levels cannot be verified by a third party.
8 Each
of the inputs generates quadratic disutility costs—ΓH (xH) =
1
2
(xH)
2, and ΓS (xS) =
1
2
(xS)
2.
We now extend this framework, drawing from Grossman and Helpman (2004) to allow H the
option of including an explicit performance-related incentive to mitigate supplier underinvestment in
each of the O and V organizational form choices. Implicitly, this requires the additional assumption
7In their model, firms also choose whether to locate production in a foreign country. In our setting, there is no
location choice.
8In our empirical setting, xH represents investment by the hotel brand (firm) in the relationship-specific human
capital of the operator of the property (supplier)—for example, teaching the operator about the company’s policies
and procedures. xS represents complementary investments by the operator in his/her own relationship-specific human
capital—for example, learning how to use the company’s IT systems.
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that H can observe an ex post relationship outcome that is correlated with the supplier’s input and
write a state-contingent supplier claim into the contract.9 To do this, we allow S’s input choice to
be two dimensional in that xS can be of high or low quality, where the quality of xS—but not its
level—is observable ex post. This important assumption means that H can write a performance
contract allowing S to claim a bonus in the event that its input is high quality. We assume that xS
contributes to the value of the relationship only when it is high quality.
The supplier can increase the probability that his input is high quality by exerting costly
relationship-specific effort. The effort level is chosen ex ante and reflects the anticipated pay-
offs under successful production. Effort costs the supplier E.10 We assume that if S does not exert
effort, then the probability of high-quality xS is equal to p0 > 0. If S exerts effort, the probability
of high-quality xS is equal to pE > p0.
When both xH and xS are positive and xS is high quality, the value of realized production is:
Y = F (xH , xS, θ) = θ (hxH + xS). The parameter h measures the relative importance of H’s input,
so that a production function is intensive in H’s input whenever h > 1. If xS is low quality, final
output is Y = θ (hxH). The expected final output, prior to production taking place, can therefore
be summarized as follows:
EY = F (xH , xS, θ, p (·)) = θ (hxH + xSp (·)) I (1)
where p(·) is equal to either p0 or pE and I is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if
xH > 0, and xS > 0.
11
H and S bargain with each other ex ante about the divisions of relationship surplus. The
organizational form choice of O or V affects each party’s bargaining power in the negotiation because
it determines their outside options. Under O, failure to reach agreement on the division of surplus
leaves both parties with zero income, since xH and xS are specific to the relationship. H is unable
to capture any value from S’s inputs, and vice versa, if negotiation breaks down. Under V, however,
9We note that the supplier’s input levels remain unobservable and non-contractible, however, it is reasonable in
our setting to assume that the hotel chain can observe some outcomes that are related to supplier input, for example,
room average daily rates are observable, which together with occupancy rates, determine hotel revenues. The chain
can also monitor aspects of guest experience.
10We note that supplier input and effort are both ex ante decisions. The distinction between the two is expositional,
and is motivated by the fact that the latter is assumed to be correlated with an observable and contractible ex post
outcome. In practice, it reflects the idea that H can write a contract based on some, but not all, aspects of measured
property-level performance.
11This indicator variable captures the facts that these two relationship-specific variables are worthless outside the
relationship and that they are complementary only in the sense that a positive amount of each one must be provided
in order to realize any output. Once this condition is met, there are no further production complementarities. This
assumption mirrors the model in Acemoglu et al. (2010), and differs from Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2010).
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if negotiations break down, H can fire the supplier, recover xS, and realize a fraction µ of the final
output. The supplier receives no income from the bargaining game in this case. That is, under O,
H and S face symmetric outside options, but H’s outside option is greater than S’s under V. Using
Aki to denote party i’s expected outside (alternative) value under organizational form k, we have:
AOH = 0, A
I
H = E (µθ (hxH + xSp (·))), and AOS = AIS = 0.
Utility and bargaining game payoffs
H’s and S’s expected utilities under organizational form k ∈ O, V are, respectively:
E
(
UkH
)
= ykH −
1
2
(
xkH
)2 − fE − fk + T k − bkp (·)k (2)
E
(
UkS
)
= ykS −
1
2
(
xkS
)2 − T k + bkp (·)k − ek (3)
where ykH and y
k
S are H’s and S’s payoffs from the Nash bargaining game, defined below. T
k denotes
an ex ante transfer payment to H from S.12 The effects of allowing H to include a performance
contract related to the quality of S’s input generates the terms bk and ek, where bk is the bonus
payment made in the event that xS is high-quality, which happens with probability p(·), and ek is
the supplier effort cost related to supplier input quality.
The bargaining process is a symmetrical Nash bargaining game, from which each party obtains
its expected outside value plus one-half of the expected quasi rents. Any performance-related bonus
payment received by the supplier ex post comes out of the share of the quasi rents going to H in
this bargaining game. Once the investments are sunk, as long as I = 1, that is, if both xH and xS
are positive, the expected quasi rents are equal to expected output less the two parties’ expected
outside options:
E
(
rk
)
= EY − AkH − AkS
E
(
rk
)
= θ (hxH + xSp (·))− AkH .
Note that the two parties bargain over the quasi rents ex post under both organizational forms;
12We assume that each potential S is credit constrained, placing a limit, l, on the size of the ex ante transfer,
T k, that H can extract from S. The constraint is more likely to bind in equilibrium for relationships with a high-
productivity draw, precisely when the high-powered performance and ownership incentives that are feasible under
outsourcing are more valuable. H cannot extract an upfront payment from an employed manager. These assumptions
match the hotel industry setting, where franchisees, but not managers, pay a fee to the brand headquarters.
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thus, party i’s expected payoff from the Nash bargaining game can be written as:
E
(
yki
)
=
1
2
E
(
rk
)
+ Aki (4)
Equilibrium choice of Organizational Form as a function of θ
For each organizational form, H chooses a bonus, bk to be paid to the supplier if his input is high
quality. A sufficiently high bonus ensures that the supplier exerts effort to increase quality, while
a low bonus makes such effort incentive incompatible.13 The endogenously determined levels of
relationship-specific investments xH , xS, and supplier quality effort, as well as the payoffs to each
party under each of these choices are derived for the outsourcing contracts without and with effective
performance incentives in Appendix A and in Appendix B for the two analogous vertical integration
contracts. Table (1) summarizes the input levels for each possible contract.
Table 1: Input levels
Organizational Form xH xSp(·) xSp(·) with effective performance incentives
Outsourcing 1
2
θh 1
2
θp0
1
2
θpE
Vertical Integration 1
2
(1 + µ)θh 1
2
(1− µ)θp0 12(1− µ)θpE
Because organizational form determines control rights, it introduces a trade off between the
equilibrium levels of H’s and S’s inputs. H invests more and S invests less under V, and vice versa
under O. We note here the complementarity between the effort exerted by S and the level of xS.
Since pE > p0, S’s input is higher under both O and V when effective performance incentives are
included so that the probability of high quality input is pE rather than p0. There is no corresponding
reduction in H’s input when performance incentives are included for the supplier.
Table (2) summarizes the payoffs to HQ under each of the four possible contracts as a function
of the equilibrium input levels. FO = fe + f
O − l and FV = fe + fV , and are the costs that do
not vary with θ under O and V, respectively (note that FV > FO because fV > fO and l > 0).
BO =
(
E
pE−p0 −
θ2(p2E−p20)
8(pE−p0)
)
and BV =
(
E
pE−p0 −
θ2(p2E−p20)(1−µ)2
8(pE−p0)
)
are the incentive compatible bonus
payments to S under O and V, respectively, paid in the event that supplier input is high quality.
Because each of H’s payoff functions in Table (2) is monotonically increasing in θ and also take
13We later discuss how the terms of a typical franchise contract make supplier effort incentive incompatible or
compatible. We note that receiving a fixed share of hotel revenues corresponds to a higher bonus payment when a
property had higher revenues.
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Table 2: HQ payoffs
Contractual Form E(UkH)
(i) Outsourcing no effective performance incentives 1
8
θ2h2 + 1
4
θ2p20 − FO
(ii) Outsourcing with effective performance incentives 1
8
θ2h2 + 1
4
θ2p2E − FO − pEBO
(iii) VI no effective performance incentives 1
8
θ2h2(1 + µ)2 + 1
4
θ2p20(1− µ2)− FV
(iv) VI with effective performance incentives 1
8
θ2h2(1 + µ)2 + 1
4
θ2p2E(1− µ2)− FV − pEBV
on different values when θ = 0, each of the four payoff functions intersects at most once with
each of the other three. Appendix A shows that there is a threshold θ above which outsourcing
with performance contracts is preferred over outsourcing without sufficient performance incentives.
Figure (2), Panel A, illustrates the payoffs to outsourcing as a function o θ2. The lowest value
of θ2 where performance incentives are included is θ2∗O =
8pEE
(p2E−p20)(3pE−2p0)
. Appendix B presents
the equivalent analysis for HQs payoffs from vertical integration. The threshold value of θ2 above
which H includes performance incentives is θ2∗V =
8pEE
(p2E−p20)(3pE−2p0−µ2(pE−2p0)−2µpE)
. Figure (2) Panel
B illustrates these payoffs.14
Figure 2: Illustrative payoffs to HQ under the four contracts
HQ Payoffs
θ2
O with no 
performance 
incentives
O with 
performance 
incentives 
Panel A: Outsourcing Payoffs
θ2
V with no performance 
incentives
V with 
performance 
incentives
HQ Payoffs
Panel B: Vertical Integration Payoffs
θ*O θ*V
To find the contractual form that yields the highest payoffs to HQ at each level of θ across all
four possible contracts, we consider Panels A and B of Figure (2) together. When θ is zero, and
given that FO < FV , it is clear from Table (2) that outsourcing with no performance incentives
14We note that θ2∗O < θ
2∗
V , and Appendix C shows that the difference in the slopes of the payoffs functions from
including performance incentives is greater for outsourcing. This reflects two facts: First, without performance
incentives, payoffs to outsourcing increase in θ at a lower rate than for vertical integration (when h > p0). Second,
with performance incentives, payoffs to outsourcing increase in θ at a faster rate than for vertical integration. The
bonus needed to incentivize supplier quality effort—a cost to HQ—is lower under outsourcing at each level of θ
because of the complementarity between S’s input xS and S’s effort to ensure the input is high quality.
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yields the highest payoffs. We focus on the payoffs to vertical integration without performance
incentives (the less steep function in Panel B) and relate it to the two payoff functions in Panel
A. For vertical integration to be the preferred organizational form for an intermediate range of θ
values—matching the patterns observed in the data—it must be that the lowest value of θ at which
vertical integration is preferred to outsourcing with no performance incentives, denoted θ, is smaller
than the lowest value of θ at which when outsourcing with performance incentives is preferred to
vertical integration, denoted θ.
Appendix C derives θ and θ in equations (19) and (20). They are:
θ =
√
8(FV − FO)
µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
,
and:
θ =
√
8pEG− 8(FV − FO)(
J
(
2 + pE
K
)− µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20))
where J = (p2E − p20), K = (pE − p0) and G = E(pE−p0) , all positive constants by assumption.
θ is greater than θ whenever:
(FV − FO) < pEE
(p2E − p20)(3pE − 2p0)
µ
(
h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20,
)
which is equivalent to stating that θ ≥ θ whenever θ∗O ≥ θ. This is the case when:
8(FV − FO) < θ∗Oµ
(
h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20,
)
(5)
This condition therefore requires that the lowest level of θ at which V is preferred over O without
performance incentives is less than the lowest level of θ at H opts to include effective performance
incentives in an outsourcing contract. It requires that the relative fixed costs of V are not too large
compared to the increase in variable payoffs under V, and that the output benefits of S’s effort with
performance incentives (related to pE − p0) are not large relative to S’s effort cost, E. Figure (3)
Panel A illustrates a case when this condition holds.
At this point, it is worth noting that a model that does not include the performance incentives
aspect of outsourcing contracts cannot generate an intermediate range of θ values over which V is
preferred to O. For example, the model in Antras and Helpman (2004) would generate payoffs to H
12
Figure 3: Vertical Integration is preferred for θ ∈ (θ, θ).
HQ Payoffs
θ2
O with no 
performance 
incentives
O with 
performance 
incentives 
Panel A: Vertical Integration yields highest 
payoffs only at intermediate levels of θ
V with no performance 
incentives
θ θ
HQ Payoffs
θ2
O with no 
performance 
incentives
O with 
performance 
incentives 
V with no performance 
incentives
θ θ
Panel B: With a higher h, Vertical 
Integration yields highest payoffs over a 
wider range of θ.
that are increasing in θ under both O and V and there would be a single crossing point where payoffs
to each organizational form were equal. This would be analogous to comparing the two less steep
payoff functions in each panel of Figure (??). The fact that, in this model, the payoffs to O are more
convex in θ than the payoffs to V is a consequence of H’s decision to include performance incentives
in the O contract above a certain θ level, θO. It is this aspect of the O contract that produces the
scenario in Figure (3) Panel A where V is preferred only over an intermediate productivity range.
Empirical predictions
Within-brand variation in organizational form
Viewing the firm that owns the hotel brand as H and the franchisee or manager of a hotel property
S, the model can explain the non-monotonic empirical relationship presented in the introduction.
Under the parameter restrictions implied in inequality (5), the model predicts that properties with
the lowest and highest productivity levels are franchised while those at intermediate productivity
levels are managed by headquarters.
Across-brand variation in organizational form
We next assume that hotel brands vary in the intensity with which H’s relationship-specific invest-
ment is used in production. In the model, this characteristic of a hotel brands production function
is measured by h, and the magnitude of h affects the predicted relationship between property pro-
ductivity and organizational form choice for a hotel brand. Appendix C shows that the derivative
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of θ2 with respect to h2 is negative and the derivative of θ2 with respect to h2 is positive. This
means that at higher levels of h, θ is lower and θ is higher, holding all other model parameters fixed.
That is, the range of θ for which vertical integration is preferred over either form of outsourcing is
larger for hotel brands where HQ’s investment is used intensively in production. This situation is
illustrated in Figure (3), Panel B. Intuitively, this case arises when the variable output gains from
V are large enough to outweigh the complementarities between effort and xS under franchising even
at high productivity levels.
Variation in organizational form when taxes are included
So far, there has been no role for government in this framework. Extending the model to include
taxes on H’s and S’s payoffs shows that the relationship between productivity and organizational
form choice varies with the tax rate. We assume that H would be taxed on its net payoffs—its share
of quasi-rents less transfers and bonuses to and from the supplier and less fixed costs.15 Similarly,
we assume that the outsourced supplier would be taxed on its net payoffs—its share of quasi-rents
plus any bonus received less any transfers paid to H. The tax rate affects equilibrium input levels
from each party and the range of property productivity levels for which V is preferred to O.
Both θ and θ are increasing in the tax rate, here labeled τ :
θτ =
√
8(FV − FO)
(1− τ)µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
, (6)
θτ =
√√√√ 8pEE(1−τ)2(pE−p0) − 8(FV −FO)(1−τ)
(p2E−p20)(3pE−2p0)
(pE−p0) − µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20)
(7)
At the end of Appendix C we show that (θτ − θτ ) is also increasing in τ . Taken together, these
results suggest that in the presence of higher taxes, H prefers V over both forms of O over a higher
and larger range of values of θ. The intuition for this finding is that introducing a tax reduces
the convexity in θ of each of H’s payoff functions. However, the tax on the bonus payment to the
supplier when performance incentives are included has a particularly damaging effect on H’s payoffs
15While H may not be located in the same tax location as the property, it’s corporate taxes are apportioned based
on the location where profits are earned (Suarez Serrato and Zider, 2016). We simplify the relevant tax rules to
assume all of H’s property-level revenues and costs are incurred in the same location as the actual property. As
described in Suarez Serrato and Zidar (2016), state-specific rules that govern how national profits of multi-state
firms are allocated for tax purposes are referred to as apportionment rules. For the sake of this paper, we assume all
payoffs associated with a property are subject to the state-specific local corporate tax rate.
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because H must compensate for S’s higher tax when ensuring the bonus is high enough to make
quality effort incentive compatible for S. This is what gives the results that θ increases in the tax
rate at a faster rate than θ.
3 Data
The data used in the paper comes from large multi-unit hotel chains in the United States. There
were 38 chains with variation in organizational form across chain properties between 2004 and 2009.
We analyze property-level information collected by the hospitality market research firm Smith Travel
Research (STR) for over 9,300 hotels that are affiliated with one of these brands. We divide the
properties into two groups: Properties whose organizational form did not change over the data
period—around 92% of the total—and the 8% whose organizational form changed at least once
during the six-year period.
Table 3, Panel A summarizes the 8616 hotel properties whose organizational form was unchanged
between 2004 and 2009 and were affiliated with a brand that employs both organizational forms.
Among these hotels, the typical property has 151 rooms and an average daily rate of $93.11 USD.
Of these hotel properties, 70 percent are managed by franchisees and 30 percent are managed by
the hotel brand. This variable refers to the day-to-day management of the hotel property.16
STR segments these 38 hotel brands into four tiers: economy, midscale, upscale, and upper
upscale. Brands are grouped into quality tiers by STR based on average room rate, and the higher
quality tier brands tend to have larger properties. STR also collects data from properties in a luxury
tier (e.g., Four Seasons), but there is very little within-brand variation in organizational form for
brands in this tier—almost all properties are vertically integrated. Accordingly, we exclude them
from the empirical work. While STR requires that the complete list of the names of the brands in
each tier remain confidential, representative brands for the different tiers studied here are Motel 6,
Holiday Inn, Radisson, and Marriott, respectively.
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 3, Panel A, document the tier-level information. In the economy tier,
there are six brands with variation in organizational form and 1385 properties. Of these properties,
71 percent are hotel brand-managed, but this reflects that fact that for one of the largest brands,
16 In the case of chain-managed properties, the asset could be owned by headquarters or a third party. In the case
of franchised properties, the asset is likely to be owned by the franchisee managing the hotel but could, alternatively,
be owned by a different third party. This is one reason why we have focused on occupancy rate, which is a measure
of asset-use intensity, as our measure of productivity. The asset in question is the right to manage the hotel (and
specifically, the hotel room) rather than ownership rights over the physical property.
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96% of properties are brand-managed. For the other brands, the share is much lower. The midscale
tier has thirteen brands with variation in organizational form. 15 percent of the 3704 properties in
this tier are hotel brand-managed. The upscale tier includes ten brands with at least one property
of each organizational form, and a total of 2405 properties, of which 33 percent are hotel brand-
managed. The upper upscale tier includes 1122 properties under nine brands, and 46 percent of the
properties are managed by employees of the hotel brand rather than by franchisees.
For each hotel property, we observe the monthly occupancy rate from January 2004 to December
2009.17 To construct the productivity measure for properties that do not change their organizational
form, we compute the average occupancy rate for each property over all months in the data. This
measure is comparable across hotels of very different sizes. The overall average monthly occupancy
rate for the properties in the data is 64.6%, and the standard deviation is 28.7%. The mean
occupancy rate varies from 60.6 percent to 68.0 percent across tiers, and the standard deviation in
occupancy rate across tiers varies from 9.5 percent to 12.2 percent.
Table 3, Panel B, presents summary statistics about the 752 hotels from the same 38 hotel brands
that switched from being chain managed to franchised, or vice versa, in the time period studied.
There were 521 instances of switching from company owned to franchised and 261 instances of
switching from franchised to company owned. Among the 752 properties, 24 switched organizational
form twice, and 2 properties switched four times. For each of these properties, we use the average
occupancy rate in each quarter to investigate within-property variation in occupancy rate and
organizational form.
Finally, we also observe the location of each property; hotels are dispersed among all 50 states.
The think tank the Tax Foundation collects and publishes data on state-level corporate income
taxes for recent years.18 We use the 2009 marginal corporate tax rate for each state as a correlate
of hotel brand’s cost of providing franchisees with explicit performance incentives. The tax rates
vary from zero in Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming and only 0.26% in Ohio, to 12% in
Iowa, 9.99% in Pennsylvania, 9.975% in the District of Columbia, and 9.8% in Minnesota.
17This measure could alternatively be interpreted as a quantity-based measure of property output—or nights’
stays—per hotel room. The appendix shows that the empirical predictions from the previous section are robust
to this interpretation because there is a monotonic predicted relationship between productivity and output in the
model.
18These data are available at: http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-corporate-income-tax-rates
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Within-brand variation in Organizational Form
Empirical Strategy
This section focuses on the main sample of hotel properties summarized in Table 3 Panel A that
have the same organizational form throughout the sample period. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the property is chain-managed and to zero if the property is franchised. This discrete
organizational form choice can be seen as reflecting a threshold rule for an underlying latent variable
y∗, so that y = 1 if y∗ > 0 and y = 0 if y∗ ≤ 0. In this case, the latent variable y∗ is the difference
between the hotel brand’s payoffs from chain management and from franchising a property, relating
to the payoff functions described in Table (2). The payoff difference is unobserved in the data, so
we use the outcome of chain management or franchising to infer the effects of the parameters in the
underlying model determining headquarter payoffs.
We assume that y∗ is a function of the set of explanatory variables generated by the underlying
model, x, for which we use a linear approximation y∗ = β′x + ε, and normalize the variables so that
ε has a standard logistic distribution with mean zero and variance one.
The theoretical model in Section 2 assumed that productivity varies across properties, but the
other parameters of the property-level production function are fixed for hotel properties affiliated
with a given brand. It also assumed that the contracting environment is fixed within brands and
within metropolitan areas.
In practice, some model parameters are likely to vary systematically across brands and market
location in a way that affects both productivity and organizational form. Significant variation in the
contracting environment seems less likely since all properties are in the United States and there is
limited within-brand variation in the franchising contracts offered to franchisees (Lafontaine, 1992),
but it cannot be ruled out.19 To control for these factors, we include fixed effects for hotel brands
and for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).20
19Prior studies exploiting variation in the tasks required by suppliers and, hence, the contracting environment,
to examine propositions related to different models of firm boundaries include Shepard (1993), Baker and Hubbard
(2003), Azoulay (2004), and Forbes and Lederman (2009). A third empirical strategy relies on cross-industry vari-
ation in the parameters of the production function, such as asset intensity, to evaluate different model predictions.
Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2010) are recent examples of this strategy.
20MSAs are defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and used by the U.S. Census Bureau and other
U.S. government agencies for statistical purposes. There are 366 in the U.S. An MSA is defined as one or more
adjacent counties or county equivalents that have at least one urban core area of at least 50,000 population, plus
adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting
ties. The most populous MSA is the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA, with nearly 19
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Given these assumptions, the probability that the i’th hotel of the b’th brand in the l’th MSA
is chain-managed (yibl = 1) can be written as:
Pr(y∗ibl > 0|xibl, β) = Pr(β′x˜ibl + αb + γl + εibl > 0) = F (β′x˜ibl + αb + γl) (8)
where αb is a brand-specific parameter common to all other properties in brand b; γl is an MSA-
specific parameter common to all properties in MSA l; and x˜ibl includes variables related to average
property-level occupancy rate, Qibl. We estimate reduced form quadratic models of the following
type using maximum likelihood estimation:
y∗ibl = δ + αb + γl + β1Qibl + β2Q
2
ibl + εibl (9)
where δ is a constant term.
When the estimated coefficient β1 is positive and the estimated coefficient β2 is negative, the
implied relationship between the probability of being chain managed and occupancy rate takes
on an inverted U-shape, as shown in the raw data in Figure (1). To further investigate whether
this is consistent with a non-monotonic relationship in the data, these coefficients should be such
that dy
∗
dQ
> 0 for low values of Q and dy
∗
dQ
< 0 for high values of Q in the sample. If so, then
the relationship between occupancy rate and the likelihood of vertical integration actually reverses
within the sample and the estimated coefficients indicate more than just a diminishing rate of
increase in the relative profitability of chain management as occupancy rates increases. Instead,
franchising actually becomes relatively more profitable at sufficiently high occupancy rates. We find
the occupancy rate at which the expected probability of vertical integration is maximized in the
data—the value of Q where dy
∗
dQ
= 0, which occurs when Q = −β1
2β2
—and compare it to the empirical
distribution of occupancy rates.
Results
The data reveal a highly significant non-monotonic relationship between the probability of chain
management and the occupancy rate. Estimating Equation (9) including brand and MSA fixed
effects leaves us with 8359 properties from 38 brands with variation in organizational form.21 The
million inhabitants in the 2010 census, and the least populous MSA is Carson City, NV with just over 55 thousand
inhabitants.
21The remaining 257 of the 8616 properties in the data are located in MSAs where there is no observed variation
in organizational form.
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first column of Panel A of Table 4 shows that β̂1 is positive and β̂2 is negative, and both are
significant at the one percent level.22 Turning to Panel B of Table 3, the estimated coefficients
from this specification predict that the maximum probability of chain management occurs at an
occupancy rate of 76 percent. The 90th percentile of the occupancy rate distribution in the data is
78 percent. That is, at least ten percent of all properties lie to the right of the estimated maximum
probability of vertical integration and the predicted reversal occurs well within sample.
One possible omitted variable that could be correlated with both occupancy rate and propensity
to chain manage is hotel age. For example, there may be time trends in both the average propensity
to outsource hotel management and in current occupancy rates. We re-estimate our baseline specifi-
cation given in Equation (9) including the age of the property as an additional independent variable.
The results in Table 3 Column 2 show that age is positively and significantly correlated with the
probability of being chain-managed in all specifications. That is, newer hotels are relatively likely
to be franchised. Nonetheless, the non-monotonic relationship between occupancy and probability
of chain management for the overall data set and for the upscale, midscale, and economy tiers is
robust to the inclusion of this control.
We next address the potential inconsistency problem associated with estimating non-linear prob-
ability models with fixed effects (Chamberlain, 1980). This problem is particularly severe when
including many group-level fixed effects with few observations per group. Out of the 38 brands,
only two brands have fewer than 30 properties and only 12 brands have fewer than 100 properties,
which suggests that the incidental parameters problem arising from the brand fixed effects is small.
There is a much larger variance in the number of properties across each of the 211 MSAs in the
data that contain variation in organizational form. Only 49 MSAs contain more than 40 properties.
We repeat the specification given in Equation (9) on the subset of 5624 properties located in MSAs
with at least 40 properties and belonging to brands with at least one property of each organizational
form. These findings, given in Table 4 Column 3, are very similar to the results in the previous
columns.
22We present results with unclustered standard errors and standard errors clustered at the brand level for consis-
tency across specifications. While clustering may be appropriate to allow for correlated errors within brands in the
pooled data that include all 38 brands, the clustered standard errors may be misleading in the tier-level analysis
with fewer brand groups in each specification.
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4.2 Changes in Organizational Form
752 properties switch from being chain managed to franchised, or vice versa, between the start of
2004 and the end of 2009. In Figure (4) we explore whether variation in occupancy rate at the
property level is consistent with the predictions of the model. In this histogram, an observation
is at the property-quarter level, with a maximum of 24 observations per property. We regress the
property-level average occupancy rate in the quarter on property fixed effects and quarter fixed
effects. The residuals from this regression are then grouped into deciles. The histogram shows the
share of observations in each residualized occupancy rate decile that are chain managed (noting
that the range of the y-axis is 0.5 to 1). Figure (4) shows that observations in the lowest and
Figure 4: The share of chain-managed property-quarters by occupancy rate decile, for properties
with variation in organizational form
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highest decile of residualized occupancy rates are less likely to be from quarters where hotels are
chain managed relative to the observations in the seventh, eight, and ninth residualized occupancy
deciles.
While we do not have an explanation for a property’s organizational form change, and they
are a small share of total properties, at 8.7%, we infer that within-hotel occupancy rates vary
with organizational form as the model would predict. Column 4 of Table 4 shows the results of a
regression similar to Equation (9) using the sample of switching properties and including property
fixed effects. The non-monotonic relationship between variation in the monthly occupancy rate and
in the share of properties that are chain managed is preserved in this regression, with the estimated
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coefficient β̂1 (for occupancy rate) positive and significant at the 5% level and the β̂2 coefficient
(for occupancy rate squared) negative and significant at the 10% level. Panel B shows that the
occupancy rate with the highest predicted share of chain managed properties occurs within the
90th percentile of the distribution.
4.3 Across-brand variation in Organizational Form.
Earlier empirical work has analyzed across-brand differences in franchising rates (Lafontaine, 1992;
others). Table 3 reveals that higher quality tier hotel brands are more likely to be chain-managed
on average, but the model set out in Section 2 suggests that the relationship between property
productivity and organizational form may vary systematically across hotel brands. The model
shows that the predicted range of productivity levels within a brand over which vertical integration
is preferred, (θ, θ), is increasing in the model parameter h, which is the intensity with which H’s
input is used in the production function. We assume that higher quality brands, as defined by
the data provider, STR, to mean more expensive hotels, are more intensive in H’s input. For
these brands, investments in service quality and training are substantial.23 This generates across-
brand variation in the nature of the production function, as well as within brand variation due to
property-level variation in productivity, whereby vertical integration is preferred by the hotel chain
for a larger range of hotel productivity levels when the hotel brand is higher quality.
To evaluate this prediction, we re-estimate Equation (9) separately for each quality tier. Table
5 shows that the non-monotonic relationship between the probability of vertical integration and
occupancy is present for the economy, midscale and upscale tiers. That is, the estimated parameter
β̂1 is positive and β̂2 is negative for each of these tiers, shown in Columns 1 to 3, respectively for
these quality tiers.
The maximum likelihood of chain management in each tier occurs within sample, as seen in the
first three columns of Panel B of Table 5. For the economy tier, the predicted maximum probability
of chain management occurs at 69 percent. This is below the 90th percentile occupancy rate in the
data. For the midscale chain, the maximum predicted probability of chain management occurs at
around 76 percent occupancy, within the 90th percentile of occupancy rates observed in the data.
For the upscale chain, the maximum predicted probability of chain management occurs at around 73
percent occupancy, again within the 90th percentile. For these quality tiers, HQ increasingly prefers
outsourcing to chain management at high levels of productivity, suggesting that these relationships
23The higher quality the brand, the more likely it is that hotel chain values consistency in training across different
hotel properties (Applegate et al. 2008).
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generate higher payoffs to HQ.
The estimated coefficients look quite different for the highest quality tier of hotels in these
data, the upper upscale tier. As shown in Table 5 Column 4, the estimated coefficient β̂1 (for
occupancy rate) is positive and the β̂2 coefficient (for occupancy rate squared) is negative, but both
estimated coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. There is therefore no evidence of the
non-monotonic relationship between occupancy and the probability of vertical integration for this
high-quality tier.
Table 5 Column 5 repeats the specification leading to Table 4 Column 4, analyzing only those
properties that switched organizational form during the sample and including property fixed effects.
This specification, however, includes only the brands in quality tiers other than the upper upscale
tier. The estimated coefficients suggest a stronger non-monontonic relationship than was revealed
among all properties that switched organizational form. The estimated coefficients are both signif-
icant at the 1% level, and Panel B shows that the maximum probability of chain management is
estimated to be just above the 50th percentile of the occupancy rate distribution.
Returning to the main data sample of properties that did not change organizational form during
the sample, Table 6 presents the results by tier including age of property (Panels A and B) and then
only within large MSAs (Panels C and D), mirroring Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4. The results by
tier are robust across these specifications. The non-monotonic relationship is absent from the upper
upscale quality tier. In the overall data, and in the upscale, midscale and economy tiers, properties
with low and high occupancy rates are relatively more likely to be managed by franchisees. The
variation in organizational form in the upper upscale tier does not show this variation, and can be
related to a version of the model in Section 2 where the brand-level production function is intensive
in the chain’s relationship-specific investment, increasing the payoffs to property chain management
at all productivity levels.
Table 7 presents an additional robustness test. The data are limited to those hotel brands where
at least 10% of properties are chain managed and at least 10% are franchisee managed. It shows
that the results, overall, and by tier, are not driven by brands with a very low incidence of either
organizational form.
4.4 Across-location variation in Organizational Form.
A simple extension to the main theoretical framework in Section 2 showed that taxing both parties
reduced the convexity of the hotel chain’s payoffs in property productivity under each organizational
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forms. This led to the observation that higher tax rates shifted up the range of property productivity
over which vertical integration was preferred, and also increased the size of the range over which
it was preferred. In the data, the hotel properties are distributed across all 50 U.S. states, and
therefore face varying state corporate tax rates. Twelve of the 38 hotel chains operate across 40 to
50 states, ten are in 30 to 39 states, eight in 20 to 29, five in 11 to 19, and only three hotel chains
are in fewer than 10 states.
We test whether the relationship between organizational form and occupancy within a given
brand varies with state corporate tax rates. We split the data into properties located in states with
a marginal tax rate below the 2009 median level of 6.5% and those that are located in states with
higher marginal tax rates. We then estimate Equation (9) separately for each subsample. Table
8 presents the results for the pooled data, and then for each tier, for the sub-sample of properties
located in states where the marginal rate of state corporate tax is lower than the median rate
of 6.5%. The adjacent column for the pooled data set and for each tier, presents the equivalent
coefficient estimates for properties in states where the marginal tax rate exceeds 6.5%.24
The model predicts that the maximum predicted probability of chain management occurs at a
higher occupancy rate in states with high marginal corporate tax rates. The results for the economy
and midscale tiers offer some evidence that is consistent with this prediction. In each of these two
tiers, the maximum predicted probability of chain management occurs at a higher occupancy rate
in states with higher marginal state taxes. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the frequency distribution
of hotels of different occupancy rates is similar across properties of the same brand in low- and
high-tax states. However, for the economy quality tier, the predicted maximum probability of chain
management occurs at 67% in low tax states and 71% in high tax states. For the midscale quality
tier, the predicted maximum probability of chain management occurs at 74% occupancy in low tax
states and at 79% occupancy in high tax states. These findings are consistent with a given brand
continuing to prefer vertical integration at higher productivity levels in states where outsourcing
generates lower relative profits for HQ. The results for the upscale tier in Table 7 do not provide
any evidence consistent with the prediction. While the results for the properties in high-tax states
exhibit the non-monotonic relationship, the estimation for the properties in low-tax states does not
yield a β̂2 that is significantly different from zero.
To further investigate this prediction, we also estimate the following specification, which includes
24Splitting up the data into the high and low tax subsamples causes us to exclude some of the observations in
Tables 4 and 5—those properties from brands with no within-group variation in organizational form in one of the
two subsamples. This leaves us with fewer observations in each specification.
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interactions of property-level Q and Q2 with the state-level marginal tax rate, Ts:
y∗ibls = δ + αb + γl + β0Ts + β1Qibl + β2Q
2
ibl + β3QiblTs + β4Q
2
iblTs + εibl (10)
In this specification, the value of Q where dy
∗
dQ
= 0 is given by Q = −(β1+β3Ts)
2(β2+β4Ts)
.25 We ask whether
the predicted maximum probability of chain management occurs at a lower occupancy rate for
properties of a given brand located in states at the 10th percentile of the distribution of Ts than at
the 90th percentile.
Table 9 presents the results of the specification set out in Equation (10); it shows how the
maximum predicted probability of chain management varies with the marginal corporate tax rate.
Table 9 Panel B uses the coefficients estimated in Panel A to calculate the occupancy rate where
the predicted probability of vertical integration is maximized at the 10th percentile tax rate and
the 90th percentile tax rate. Consistent with the models predictions, for midscale and economy
brands the maximum predicted probability of chain management occurs at higher occupancy rates
in states at the 90th percentile tax rate.
5 Conclusion
For upscale, midscale, and economy U.S. hotel brands, hotel properties with intermediate levels
of occupancy are relatively more likely to be chain-managed. Low- and high-occupancy hotels are
relatively more likely to be franchised. In addition, the occupancy rate range of vertically integrated
properties in lower quality tiers is shifted up in states with high marginal corporate tax rates.
The model developed in the paper to rationalize these findings is quite general, and applies
to the question of why some intermediate inputs are made in-house and others are bought from
an arm’s length supplier. The data validate a key insight from the model—even when the firm’s
investment is used relatively intensively in production, the effect of performance incentives on
supplier investment can lead to outsourcing at high productivity levels. A property rights model
that includes ownership incentives but not performance incentives cannot explain the non-monotonic
relationship observed for the majority of firms in the industry studied here. Combining both the
property rights and performance incentives mechanisms in one model reveals that ownership and
performance incentives for the supplier can be complementary means to mitigate underinvestment
25The coefficient β0 is identified using variation in organizational form within the small number of MSAs that span
state boundaries.
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at some levels of productivity.26
We view our findings as evidence that firms use all the tools at their disposal to mitigate
underinvestment problems due to incomplete contracts. As Gibbons (2005) notes, ownership can be
viewed as one of the instruments in an incentive-system theory of the firm (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1994). Incentives related to measured performance are one other instrument that can be employed
when some aspect of supplier input is observable and, hence, contractible. Specifically, when firms
have the ability to write performance contracts based on an observable outcome correlated with
input levels, the complementarity between the performance incentives and ownership incentives at
high levels of productivity can lead firms to choose outsourcing when ownership incentives alone
would favor vertical integration.
26A franchisee is less concerned than an employed manager about future holdup and, hence, earns higher marginal
returns from increased effort on all tasks as productivity increases under a performance contract. This is the source
of the complementarity of the two types of incentives. In contrast, incentives can be complementary in Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1994) and Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004), in part because time-constrained workers choose how to
divide their time between different activities.
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Appendix A: H’s payoffs under Outsourcing
The outsourcing contract specifies the upfront fee to be paid by the supplier (S) to H, TO (up to
the capital constraint l) and a bonus payment bO to be paid to S only in the event that S’s input
is observed to be high-quality ex post. H chooses TO and bO so as to maximize its own utility
given that it can predict how S will respond to the terms of the contract and subject to the S’s
participation and capital constraints.
The discrete nature of ek and the probability function p (·) allows us to specify the payoffs to
H under each effort level.27,28 When the capital constraint does not bind, H can provide incentives
for the entrepreneur to exert the efficient level of effort through the bonus payment bO. H can then
capture all of the rents through the upfront fee TO. However, when the capital constraint does bind
and positive effort is optimal, H must either accept suboptimal effort levels or share rents with the
entrepreneur.29
Under organizational form k = O, and using equation (4), H’s expected utility from an out-
sourcing contract is:
EUOH = Ey
O
H −
1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fO + TO − bOp (·)O
=
1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp (·))]− 1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fO + TO − bOp (·)O
H chooses xH to maximize this expected utility, which gives: xH =
1
2
θh.
Under k = O, outsourcing, S’s expected utility is:
EUOS = Ey
O
S −
1
2
(xS)
2 − TO + bOp (·)O − ek
=
1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp (·))]− 1
2
(xS)
2 − TO + bOp (·)O − ek
The level of xS that maximizes S’s expected utility is: xS =
1
2
θp (·). We note that H’s input, xH , is
27We require that p0 > 0, so that p0xS > 0. Even if xS is low-quality with a high probability, positive output will
be realized as long as xH and xS are positive. We also note that effort is specific to the relationship.
28The model allows for only two possible effort levels: zero effort and positive effort. In Grossman and Helpman
(2004), effort is a continuous variable. Our intent is to generate the non-monotonic relationship between productivity
and the probability that a property is vertically integrated using the simplest possible specification.
29An alternative way to allow for H to include performance incentives might be to allow them to contract on
bargaining weights. Supplier input would then be affected by bargaining weights under outsourcing, and by both
bargaining weights and the the fraction of output recovered by H under vertical integration. The setup presented
here—which has fixed bargaining weights but allows for a contractable bonus payment related to output—allows the
different types of incentives to affect two different types of supplier input, and allows us to illustrate the separate
roles of each incentive type. We believe the alternative setup would generate similar empirical predictions (at the
cost of obscuring some of the mechanisms at work in Antras-Helpman (2004) and Grossman-Helpman (2004)).
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independent of supplier effort whereas supplier input xS is an increasing function of the probability
that the input is high quality. This is the source of the complementarity discussed in the main body
of the paper.
a) Outsourcing without performance incentives
In this equilibrium, xS =
1
2
θp0, xH =
1
2
θh and the effort cost is 0, so no bonus payment is required,
bO = 0. To ensure that S’s participation constraint is met, his expected payoff must be at least zero
(his outside option), so
0 ≤ 1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp0)]− 1
2
(xS)
2 − TO + bOp0 − ek
The upfront fee T ∗ = 1
4
θ2h2 + 1
8
θ2p20 is the optimal transfer from H’s point of view, the highest
upfront fee at which S’s participation constraint binds. If T ∗ > l this optimal transfer exceeds S’s
capital constraint; then TO = l, otherwise TO = T ∗.
To ensure that S does not deviate and exert positive effort, we assume that for the range of θ
where this organizational form is chosen: E
p2E−p20
≥ 1
8
θ2.30
If S’s capital constraint does not bind, allowing H to specify TO = T ∗, HQ’s expected payoffs
are:
EUOH =
1
2
[θ
(
h
1
2
θh+
1
2
θp20
)
]− 1
2
(
1
2
θh
)2
− fE − fO + T + θ2
=
3θ2
8
(
h2 + p20
)− fE − fO
and, if the capital constraint binds, TO = l, expected H payoffs are:
EUOH =
1
8
θ2h2 +
1
4
θ2p20 − fE − fO + l. (11)
30Note that if S does deviate, the marginal benefit of his own relationship-specific investment also changes, so a
different level of xS will be chosen. If S deviates to e
k = E, re-solving the optimal xS choice for the supplier gives:
x∗S =
1
2θpE (xH will not change under this deviation).
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b) Outsourcing with performance incentives
In this equilibrium, xS =
1
2
θpE, xH =
1
2
θh. The cost of effort is E, and a bonus payment is required,
bO. To ensure that S’s participation constraint is met:
0 ≤ 1
2
[θ (hxH + xSpE)]− 1
2
(xS)
2 − TO + bOpE − E
where T ∗ = 1
4
θ2h2 + 1
8
θ2p2E + b
OpE −E is the optimal transfer from H’s point of view. If T ∗ > l, so
that this optimal transfer exceeds S’s capital constraint, then TO = l, otherwise TO = T ∗.
If S were to deviate to e = 0, then re-solving the optimal xS choice for S gives x
∗
S =
1
2
θp0. To
ensure incentive compatibility, not wanting to deviate to ek = 0 given TO and xH requires:
1
4
[θ2h2 + θ2]p2E]−
1
8
(θpE)
2 − TO + bOpE − E ≥ 1
4
[θ2h2 + θ2p20]−
1
8
(θp0)
2 − TO + bOp0
This implies the following restriction on the relationship between the specified bonus, effort levels
and the probability of high-quality xS:
bO (pE − p0) ≥ E − 1
8
θ2(p2E − p20)
Therefore, H will set bO at the lowest value that this inequality is satisfied:
bO =
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0) .
Note that the bonus required to incentivize S’s effort is decreasing in θ.
If the capital constraint does not bind, the expected bonus payment
(
bOpE
)
drops out of the
payoffs since H can extract it from S upfront. H’s expected payoff is:
EUOH =
1
2
[
θ
(
h
1
2
θh+
1
2
θp2E
)]
− 1
2
(
1
2
θh
)2
− bOpE − fE − fO + TO + θ2
=
3θ2
8
(
h2 + p2E
)− fE − fO − E
and, in the event that the capital constraint binds, H’s expected payoff is:
EUOH =
1
8
θ2h2 +
1
4
θ2p2E − pE
(
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0)
)
− fE − fO + l (12)
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Finding θ above which performance incentives are included in an O contract
When expression (12) is greater than expression (11), H prefers the outsourcing contract that
includes performance incentives. This is the case when:
1
8
θ2h2 +
1
4
θ2p2E − pE
(
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0)
)
− fE − fO + l > 1
8
θ2h2 +
1
4
θ2p20 − fE − fO + l
Simplifying:
1
4
θ2p2E − pE
(
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0)
)
>
1
4
θ2p20
so performance incentives are preferred for relatively high productivity levels:
θ∗O >
√
8pEE
(p2E − p20) (3pE − 2p0)
(13)
Appendix B: H’s payoffs under Vertical Integration
The contract sets out the required effort level and a bonus payment, bV , to be paid if the manager’s
investment is high-quality. There is no upfront transfer T I from S to H because H cannot specify
a negative wage for a chain-employed property manager. As outlined above, the surplus generated,
rV , reflects the fact that H’s outside value is non-zero under vertical integration.
Under organizational form k = V , and using equation (4), H’s expected utility under vertical
integration is:
EUVH = y
V
H −
1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fV − bV p (·)
EUVH =
1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp(·))− µθ (hxH + xS(·))]− 1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fV − bV p (·) + µθ (hxH + xSp(·))
H chooses xH to maximize this expected utility, giving xH =
1
2
(1 + µ) θh.
Under organizational form k = V , and using equation (4), S’s expected utility under vertical
integration is:
EUVS = y
V
S −
1
2
(xS)
2 + bV p (·)− eV
=
1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp(·))− µθ (hxH + xSp(·))]− 1
2
(xS)
2 + bV p (·)− eV
The supplier chooses xS and effort levels to maximize this expected utility. This gives xS =
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1
2
(1− µ) θp(·). As under outsourcing, H’s input, xH , is independent of supplier input and effort,
and supplier input, xS, is an increasing function of supplier effort.
c) Vertical integration without performance incentives
In this equilibrium, xH =
1
2
(1 + µ) θh. If the manager exerts the desired effort, then xS =
1
2
(1− µ) θp0. S’s expected utility is:
EUVS = Ey
V
S −
1
2
(xS)
2
=
1
2
[θ (hxH + xSp0)− µθ (hxH + xSp0)]− 1
2
(xS)
2
=
1
4
θ2 (1− µ)
[
h2 (1 + µ) +
1
2
(1− µ) p20
]
This expected payoff satisfies the participation constraint (because p0 and µ are between 0 and 1).
To ensure that the manager does not want to deviate and exert effort, we need that for the range
of θ where this contract is preferred: E ≥ θ2(1−µ)2
8
[p2E − p20].
H’s expected payoff is:
EUVH = y
V
H −
1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fV − bV p (·)
=
1
2
ErV + AVi −
1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fV − bIp (·)
=
θ
2
(1 + µ)
[
h
1
2
(1 + µ) θh+
1
2
(1− µ) θp20
]
− 1
2
(
1
2
(1 + µ) θh
)2
− fE − fV
EUVH =
θ2h2
8
(1 + µ)2 +
θ2
4
(
1− µ2) p20 − fE − fV (14)
d) Vertical integration with performance incentives
In this equilibrium, p(·) = pE. The expected payoff to S if he doesn’t deviate is:
EUVS =
1
4
θ2 (1− µ)
[
h2 (1 + µ) +
1
2
(1− µ) pE
]
+ bV pE − E
If S were to deviate to e = 0:
EUVS =
1
4
θ2 (1− µ)
[
h2 (1 + µ) +
1
2
(1− µ) p20
]
+ bV p0
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Thus, the lowest bonus payment required to ensure that the S does not deviate is:
bV =
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2 (1− µ)2
8 (pE − p0)
[
p2E − p20
]
.
We note that the bonus required is decreasing in θ, but at a lower rate than under O with incentives,
since (1− µ)2 ≤ 1. The expected payoff to S is:
EUVS =
1
4
θ2 (1− µ)
[
h2 (1 + µ) +
1
2
(1− µ) p2E
]
+ pE
[
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2 (1− µ)2
8 (pE − p0)
[
p2E − p20
]]− E,
which our restrictions ensure is positive.
The expected payoff to H is:
EUVH =
θ
2
(1 + µ) [hxH + xSpE]− 1
2
(xH)
2 − fE − fV − bpE
EUVH =
θ2h2
8
(1 + µ)2 +
θ2
4
(
1− µ2) p2E − fE − fV − pE
[
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2 (1− µ)2
8 (pE − p0)
[
p2E − p20
]]
(15)
Finding θ above which performance incentives are included in a V contract
When expression (15) is greater than expression (14), H prefers the vertical integration contract
that includes performance incentives. This is the case when:
1
4
θ2 (1 + µ) (1− µ) p2E − pE
(
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(1− µ)2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0)
)
>
1
4
θ2 (1 + µ) (1− µ) p20
θ2 ≥ 8pEE
(p2E − p20) (3pE − 2p0 − µ2(pE − 2p0)− 2µpE)
Hence, H chooses to include performance incentives and share rents with the supplier under V
whenever the relationship productivity is sufficiently high—that is, when:
θ∗V ≥
√
8pEE
(p2E − p20) (3pE − 2p0 − µ2(pE − 2p0)− 2µpE)
(16)
The lowest productivity at which H chooses to include performance incentives in O is given by
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inequality (13), this is a lower productivity than the threshold given in (16) if the denominator of
(16) is smaller, i.e. when:
(
p2E − p20
)
(3pE − 2p0) >
(
p2E − p20
) (
3pE − 2p0 − µ2(pE − 2p0)− 2µpE
)
pE(2 + µ)− p02µ > 0,
which is always true because 0 < µ < 1 and pE > p0 by assumption. That is, performance incentives
become preferred under O at a lower level of θ than under V. Both thresholds are increasing in the
effort cost E and decreasing in the difference between pE and p0, related to the marginal benefit of
effort.
Appendix C: Maximum payoffs to H as a function of θ
Each of H’s four payoff functions shown in Table (2) and derived in Appendices A and B is mono-
tonically increasing and differently convex in θ. Table (10) presents the degree of convexity for
each payoff function. Comparing the convexities of the payoff functions shows that the payoffs with
Table 3: Table 10: H payoffs, Convexity in θ
Contractual Form
δ2E(UkH)
δθδθ
(i) Outsourcing no performance incentives 1
4
h2 + 1
2
p20
(ii) Outsourcing with performance incentives 1
4
h2 + 1
2
p2E +
pE(p
2
E−p20)
4(pE−p0)
(iii) VI no performance incentives 1
4
h2(1 + µ)2 + 1
2
p20(1− µ2)
(iv) VI with performance incentives 1
4
h2(1 + µ)2 + 1
2
p2E(1− µ2) + pE(1−µ)
2(p2E−p20)
4(pE−p0)
performance incentives are more convex in θ than those without. For outsourcing, the difference is:
1
4
h2 +
1
2
p2E +
pE(p
2
E − p20)
4(pE − p0) −
1
4
h2 +
1
2
p20 > 0
which is equivalent to:
(p2E − p20) (3pE − 2p0)
4(pE − p0) > 0 (17)
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and holds because pE > p0 by assumption. For vertical integration, the difference is:
1
4
h2(1 + µ)2 +
1
2
p2E(1− µ2) +
pE(1− µ)2(p2E − p20)
4(pE − p0) −
1
4
h2(1 + µ)2 +
1
2
p20(1− µ2) > 0
which is equal to:
(p2E − p20) (3pE − 2p0 − [µ2(pE − 2pO) + 2µpE])
4(pE − p0) > 0 (18)
and this also holds because the final term in round parentheses is positive since 0 < µ < 1.
These comparisons also reveal that overall payoffs to outsourcing are more convex in θ than those
to vertical integration. This is clear from the fact that the slope of outsourcing payoffs with no
performance incentives is less convex than all other payoff functions and the difference in convexity
associated with adding performance incentives is greater for outsourcing. To see this, note that the
term in the square brackets in inequality (18) is positive and so the left hand side of (18) is smaller
than the left hand side of inequality (17).
We now turn to find threshold values of θ at which the preferred organizational form changes
from O to V, or vice versa. The lowest θ at which H chooses vertical integration with no performance
incentives over outsourcing with no performance incentives, θ is:
θ2h2
8
(1 + µ)2 +
θ2
4
(
1− µ2) p20 − FV = 18θ2h2 + 14θ2p20 − FO
θ2 =
8(FV − FO)
µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
θ =
√
8(FV − FO)
µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
(19)
We note that the numerator of this expression is (8 times) the difference in the fixed costs between
the two contracts (the difference in the payoffs when θ is zero) and is positive by assumption. The
denominator is (8 times) the difference between the rate of growth of H’s payoffs from the two
contracts with respect to θ2. Hence, this threshold is the level of productivity where the increase in
variable profits from vertical integration is exactly equal to the associated increase in fixed costs.
The highest θ at which H chooses vertical integration with no performance incentives over
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outsourcing with performance incentivees, θ is:
1
8
θ2h2 +
1
4
θ2p2E − pE
(
E
(pE − p0) −
θ2(p2E − p20)
8 (pE − p0)
)
− FO = θ
2h2
8
(1 + µ)2 +
θ2
4
(
1− µ2) p20 − FV
Setting J = (p2E − p20), K = (pE − p0) and G = EK , all positive constants by assumption, this can be
written:
θ =
√
8pEG− 8(FV − FO)(
J
(
2 + pE
K
)− µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20)) (20)
We note that the numerator of this expression is (8 times) the difference between H’s payoff from
outsourcing with performance incentives and vertical integration without them when θ = 0 (it
is the difference in fixed costs, including the bonus payment for the outsourcing contract). It is
positive whenever the intercept for this vertical integration contract lies between those for the two
outsourcing contracts. The denominator is (8 times) the difference between the growth rates in θ of
H’s payoffs from outsourcing with and without performance incentives less the difference between
the growth rates in θ of H’s payoffs from vertical integration and outsourcing without performance
incentives (this second term is also the denominator in θ).
For there to be a range of θ where H prefers vertical integration with no performance incentives
to both forms of outsourcing, given that payoffs to outsourcing are convex in θ, it must be that
θ < θ¯. This is true when:
8(FV − FO)
µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
<
8pEG− 8(FV − FO)(
J
(
2 + pE
K
)− µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20))
Simplifying and substituting back in for G, J , and K gives:
(FV − FO) < pEE
(p2E − p20)(3pE − 2p0)
µ
(
h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20,
)
.
When this inequality holds, V is preferred at intermediate levels of θ, for θ ∈ (θ, θ¯).
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Comparative statics with respect to h
How does variation in the production function parameter h impact the range (θ, θ¯)? The derivative
of θ with respect to h2 is:
δθ2
δh2
=
−8(FV − FO)µ(2 + µ)
µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)2
< 0
and the derivative of θ with respect to h2 is:
δθ
2
δh2
=
(8pEG− 8(FV − FO))µ(2 + µ)(
J
(
2 + pE
K
)− µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20))2 > 0
This second derivative is positive when 8pEG − 8(FV − FO) > 0, which is the sorting condition
we need for V without performance incentives to yield payoffs to H between those of outsourcing
without and with performance incentives when θ = 0. Because θ falls with h2 and hence with h
and θ increases with h2 and h, vertical integration is predicted over a larger range of θ values at
higher levels of h.
Comparative statics with respect to the tax rate, τ
Taxing each party’s payoff at the rate τ affects each party’s input levels, the bonus required (if any)
to ensure supplier incentive compatibility, and H’s payoffs. For outsourcing with no performance
incentives, H’s and S’s expected payoffs are, respectively:
EUOH = (1− τ)
[
θ
2
(hxH + xSp0)− FO
]
− 1
2
(xH)
2
EUOS = (1− τ)
[
θ
2
(hxH + xSp0)− TO − T (O)
]
− 1
2
(xS)
2
The first-order conditions relating to input levels give xH =
(1−τ)hθ
2
and xS =
(1−τ)θp0
2
. The payoffs
to HQ, after substituting in for xH , xS are therefore:
EUOH = (1− τ)2θ2
(
h2
8
+
p20
4
)
− (1− τ)FO. (21)
For vertical integration with no performance incentives, introducing taxes leads to xH =
(1−τ)(1+µ)hθ
2
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and xS =
(1−τ)(1−µ)θp0
2
. Substituting these values into HQ’s payoffs gives:
EU IH = (1− τ)2θ2
(
h2
8
(1 + µ)2 +
p20
4
(1 + µ) (1− µ)
)
− (1− τ)FV (22)
For outsourcing with performance incentives, introducing taxes leads to xH =
(1−τ)hθ
2
and xS =
(1−τ)θpE
2
. The incentive compatibility constraint needed to ensure S opts to exert effort is:
bO =
E
(1− τ) (pE − p0) −
(1− τ)θ2(p2E − p20)
8(pE − p0)
We note that the higher is the tax, the higher is the required bonus, for two reasons: It is more
costly to cover effort costs and the required bonus required falls by less as θ increases. The payoffs
to H, after substituting in for xH , xS, and b
O, are:
EUOH = (1− τ)2θ2
(
h2
8
+
p2E
4
)
− (1− τ)pE
(
E
(1− τ) (pE − p0) −
(1− τ)θ2(p2E − p20)
8(pE − p0)
)
− (1− τ)FO.
(23)
Because the payoffs to H from each of the three contractual forms described above vary differently
with taxes, the range of θ at which vertical integration is preferred (θ, θ) is given by the two
thresholds:
θτ =
√
8(FV − FO)
(1− τ)µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)
, (24)
θτ =
√√√√ 8pEE(1−τ)2(pE−p0) − 8(FV −FO)(1−τ)
(p2E−p20)(3pE−2p0)
(pE−p0) − µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20)
(25)
The tax reduces the denominator of the lower bound θ by (1− τ) < 1 within the square root. The
impact of the tax on θ is not quite as straightforward. The first term in the numeratoris divided
by (1− τ)2 and not just (1− τ). This is because the tax increases the required bonus directly.
Taking the derivatives of (θ and θ) with respect to (1− τ) gives:
δθ2
δ(1− τ) =
−8(FV − FO)
(1− τ)2µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2p20µ)2
< 0
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δθ
2
δ(1− τ) =
− 8pEE
(pE−p0) (2− 2τ)− 8(FV − FO)
(1− τ)
(
(p2E−p20)(3pE−2p0)
(pE−p0) − µ (h2(2 + µ)− 2µp20)
) < 0
We know the denominator of each derivative is positive, and we also know that 8pEE
(pE−p0) > 8(FV −FO),
and (2 − 2τ) > 1, therefore the sign of each derivative is determined by the negative sign in each
numerator. Since each threshold is decreasing in (1− τ), we know that δθ2
δτ
> 0 and δθ
2
δτ
> 0.
We can also write down the condition under which the range (θ−θ) is larger in magnitude when
there is a positive tax relative to the no tax case. The difference between θ2 and θ
2
without taxes
can be written as:
θ
2 − θ2 = A−B
C −D −
B
D
where A, B, C and D are all positive terms, defined as per Equations (19) and (20). Using the same
notation, the differences between the analogous cutoffs accounting for taxes, 25 and 24, can be use
to write:
θ
2
τ − θ2τ =
A
(1−τ)2 − B(1−τ)
C −D −
B
(1−τ)
D
And (θ
2
τ − θ2τ ) > (θ
2 − θ2) whenever:
AD
(1− τ) −BC > (1− τ)(AD −BC).
This holds whenever 0 < τ < 1 (because AD
(1−τ) − BC > AD − BC > (1 − τ)(AD − BC)). Hence,
when taxes are introduced, both θ and θ increase and the range (θ− θ) also increases in magnitude.
Appendix D: The relationship between productivity and out-
put in equilibrium
In Section 4, we treated the property-level occupancy rate as a direct measure of property produc-
tivity, corresponding to the parameter θ in the theory developed in Section 2. This follows tradition
in the work on hotel industry. However, it is appropriate to consider an alternative interpretation
of the occupancy rate—as being a measure of variable output quantity, closer to the theoretical
construct of Y − Fk in Section 2. Under this interpretation, the occupancy rate is endogenous to
both the property-level productivity parameter θ and the input levels from each of the contracting
parties, which are, in turn, endogenous to θ and the hotel brand’s choice of organizational form.
This perspective implies that the data reveal a non-monotonic relationship between variable
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output and organizational form choice as the result of an indirect association. Since, in the theory,
organizational form choice is non-monotonic in θ, if there is a strict increasing monotonic relationship
between variable output conditional on organizational form choice and θ, then the theory implies an
indirect relationship between output and organizational form choice that is similar to the predicted
direct relationship between productivity and organizational form choice.
To explore the variation in variable output with θ, we present the expected variable output levels
as a function of θ under the three organizational forms of interest: outsourcing without performance
incentives, vertical integration without performance incentives, and outsourcing with performance
incentives. Output in each case is given by E(Y ) = θ(hxH + p(·)xS), where xH = 12θh for both
outsourcing contracts and xH =
1
2
(1+µ)θh for the vertical integration contract. Turning to S’s input,
xS =
1
2
θp0 for outsourcing without performance incentives, xS =
1
2
(1−µ)θp0 for vertical integration
without performance incentives, and xS =
1
2
θpE for outsourcing with performance incentives. We
also note that p(·) = p0 for the first two contracts and p(·) = pE for the third.
Substituting these endogenous input values to expected output, and comparing across the three
contracts, tells us, first, that output is increasing the θ under each contract and is zero when θ = 0.
Therefore, to establish that there is a monotonic relationship between productivity and output as
organizational form varies with productivity, we need to establish that the slope of H’s payoffs under
the V contract is greater than the slope of H’s payoffs under O with no performance incentives and
less than the slope of H’s payoffs under O with performance incentives. Then at the threshold
values of θ and θ at which we predict changes in organizational form, output is discontinuous and
exhibits a positive jump in each case.
Under the parameter restriction that h2 ≥ p20, output under vertical integration with no per-
formance incentives greater than under outsourcing with no performance incentives for all values
of θ > 0. Hence, at the threshold level at which H opts for V for the first time, θ, there will be
jump up in output. Similarly, the parameter restriction that is needed to ensure H’s payoffs to
outsourcing with performance incentives is more convex in θ than H’s payoffs from the V contract
is p2E − p20 ≥ µ(h2 − p20). The left hand side of this inequality is (twice) the difference between the
rate of increase in output in θ2 by adding performance incentives under outsourcing. The right
hand side is (twice) the difference in the rate of increase in θ2 of H’s payoffs from V and O without
performance incentives. Combined, then, we require:
p2E − p20 ≥ µ(h2 − p20) ≥ 0
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When this holds, there is a range of model parameters where the model predicts a monotoni-
cally increasing relationship between expected output and productivity whenever it predicts a non-
monotonic relationship between productivity and organizational form. The empirical work remains
a valid test of the relationship between productivity and organizational form choice by evaluat-
ing the existence of the indirect predicted relationship between (endogenous) variable output and
organizational form choice.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Source: STR data
PANEL A: Properties that did not change organizational form during sample
Quality Tier Total Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Number of brands with at least one franchised property and one chain managed property 38 6 13 10 9
Number of properties across all brands with at least one property of each organizational form 8616 1385 3704 2405 1122
Proportion of properties that are chain managed 30.0% 70.6% 14.7% 22.7% 46.0%
Mean property-level occupancy rate across all brands 64.6% 60.6% 63.0% 68.0% 67.8%
Standard deviation in occupancy rate across all brands 28.7% 13.5% 12.2% 10.8% 9.5%
Minimum monthly occupancy rate 10.1% 10.1% 11.9% 18.9% 20.3%
Maximum monthly occupancy rate 97.4% 93.8% 97.4% 96.5% 90.5%
Mean ADR across all brands, USD 93 48 86 108 139
Standard deviation in ADR across all brands, USD 35 11 20 20 41
Minimum ADR, USD 29 29 37 62 73
Maximum ADR, USD 780 118 248 274 780
Mean number of rooms 151 97 110 138 382
Standard deviation of number of rooms 146 38 56 65 280
Minimum number of rooms 14 14 29 60 37
Maximum number of rooms 2843 607 652 770 2843
PANEL B: Properties that did change organizational form during sample
Quality Tier Total Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Number of brands with at least one franchised property and one chain managed property 38 6 13 10 9
Number of properties across all brands with at least one property of each organizational form 752 156 205 218 173
Proportion of properties that are chain managed n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Mean property-level occupancy rate across all brands 68.2% 70.2% 63.9% 70.1% 68.3%
Standard deviation in occupancy rate across all brands 11.3% 14.9% 10.6% 9.3% 8.7%
Minimum monthly occupancy rate 23.1% 29.6% 28.0% 23.1% 40.0%
Maximum monthly occupancy rate 92.6% 91.0% 92.4% 92.6% 91.5%
Mean ADR across all brands, USD 93 39 84 106 135
Standard deviation in ADR across all brands, USD 43 14 20 22 41
Minimum ADR, USD 23 23 47 52 79
Maximum ADR, USD 324 93 179 285 324
Mean number of rooms 187 120 137 158 326
Standard deviation of number of rooms 155 25 67 96 231
Minimum number of rooms 41 41 56 62 107
Maximum number of rooms 2897 212 485 1066 2897
Property-level observations, averaged by property over monthly observations 2004-2009
Property-level observations, averaged by property over monthly observations 2004-2009
Table 4: The Relationship between Organizational Form and Output
Panel A: Estimation Output (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total 
Controlling for Age of 
Property
Subsample of MSAs 
with at least 40 
properties
Properties that Switched 
Organizational Form
Occupancy 31.20** 27.88** 25.32** 1.344*
Unclustered standard errors (3.28) (3.36) (3.57) (0.62)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (6.34) (6.31) (6.04) (1.37)
Occupancy Squared -20.59** -18.34** -16.26** -0.783+
Unclustered standard errors (2.54) (2.60) (2.76) (0.48)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (5.08) (4.87) (4.85) (1.03)
Age of Property 0.93**
Unclustered standard errors (0.04)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (0.13)
Constant -13.96** -14.34** -11.67** -4.497**
Unclustered standard errors (1.14) (1.17) (1.24) (0.77)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (2.22) (2.46) (1.97) (0.53)
N 8359 8359 5624 44132 property months, 
752 properties
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y N
Property fixed effects N N N Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y N
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Total 
Controlling for Age of 
Property
Subsample of MSAs 
with at least 40 
properties
Properties that Switched 
Organizational Form
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest* 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.86
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.78
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.88
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.92
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. 
Table 5: The Relationship between Organizational Form and Output by Hotel Brand Quality Tier
Panel A: Estimation Output (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Properties that Switched 
Organizational Form, excl. 
Upper Upscale Brands
Occupancy 43.76** 40.25** 47.07** 6.93 1.219+
Unclustered standard errors (6.67) (8.61) (9.78) (7.76) (0.68)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (12.62) (11.58) (11.23) (8.11) (1.50)
Occupancy Squared -31.55** -26.50** -32.28** -1.27 -0.865+
Unclustered standard errors (5.36) (6.70) (7.14) (5.98) (0.52)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (9.73) (9.48) (8.96) (5.59) (1.12)
Constant -14.26** -17.70** -20.81** -3.11 -3.873**
Unclustered standard errors (2.13) (2.80) (3.50) (2.44) (0.77)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (4.07) (4.08) (4.58) (3.53) (0.57)
N 1005 3039 2037 985 33126 property months, 579 
properties
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y N
Property fixed effects N N N N Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y N
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Properties that Switched 
Organizational Form, excl. 
Upper Upscale Brands
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest* 0.69 0.76 0.73 2.74 0.71
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.70
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.89
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.92
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. 
Table 6: The Relationship between Organizational Form and Output by Hotel Brand Quality Tier controlling for Property Age, and in the Subsample of MSAs with At Least 40 Properties
Panel A: Estimation Output including controls for property age (1) (2) (3) (4)
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy 42.11** 31.58** 39.15** -0.51
Unclustered standard errors (6.95) (9.09) (10.30) (8.05)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (11.91) (12.44) (12.15) (7.20)
Occupancy Squared -29.54** -20.50** -27.36** 3.76
Unclustered standard errors (5.62) (7.08) (7.52) (6.17)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (9.00) (9.80) (9.43) (4.89)
Age of Property 0.77** 2.01** 1.10** 0.50**
Unclustered standard errors (0.09) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (0.11) (0.42) (0.15) (0.19)
Constant -15.46** -17.83** -18.39** -1.39
Unclustered standard errors (2.25) (2.99) (3.69) (2.52)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (4.11) (4.73) (4.96) (3.82)
N 1005 3039 2037 985
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest* 0.71 0.77 0.72 0.07
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.69
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.78
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) (when including property age) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. When the estimated occupancy coefficient is negative 
but the coefficient on occupancy squares is positive (as is the case for the upper upscale properties), this is the occupancy rate where the probability of chain management is minimized.
Panel C: Estimation Output for the subsample of properties in MSAs with at least 40 properties
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy 32.15** 35.32** 43.39** 3.31
Unclustered standard errors (6.61) (9.20) (10.52) (7.54)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (11.27) (11.86) (9.09) (6.69)
Occupancy Squared -23.12** -22.71** -29.76** 1.24
Unclustered standard errors (5.37) (7.13) (7.67) (5.84)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (8.58) (9.61) (7.16) (4.70)
Constant -10.22** -15.88** -19.21** -1.87
Unclustered standard errors (2.12) (3.00) (3.74) (2.35)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (3.65) (4.06) (3.96) (2.98)
N 764 2320 1567 873
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel D: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest* 0.70 0.78 0.73 -1.33
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.69
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.78
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. When the estimated coefficients on occupancy rate and occupancy rate squared 
are both positive (as is the case for the upper upscale properties), this is the occupancy rate where the probability of chain management is minimized.
Table 7: Robustness test. Brands with at least 10% chain managed and at least 10% franchised properties.
Panel A: Estimation Output for the subsample of properties in brands with at least 10% chain-managed but less than 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy 43.59** 45.34** 49.89** 6.4
Unclustered standard errors (6.82) (10.53) (10.38) (7.81)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (13.36) (14.68) (11.42) (8.31)
Occupancy Squared -31.31** -31.19** -34.26** -0.781
Unclustered standard errors (5.46) (8.21) (7.56) (6.01)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (10.32) (11.64) (9.18) (5.71)
Constant -14.25** -19.09** -21.79** -2.978
Unclustered standard errors (2.18) (3.42) (3.70) (2.45)
Standard errors clustered at brand level (4.30) (5.21) (4.68) (3.62)
N 912 830 1601 948
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is 
Highest* 0.70 0.73 0.73 4.10
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.69
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.78
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.81
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. 
Table 8: Organizational Form, Occupancy, and State Marginal Corporate Tax Rate. Split Sample above and below Median Tax Rate
Panel A: Estimation Output
Marginal Tax Rate <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5%
Occupancy 26.39** 35.98** 43.02** 49.14** 41.38** 39.68** 24.69+ 64.03** -2.99 17.74
(4.66) (4.71) (10.50) (8.95) (11.46) (13.51) (13.71) (14.47) (10.81) (12.21)
Occupancy Squared -16.97** -24.06** -32.25** -34.58** -27.98** -25.15* -14.8 -45.17** 5.69 -8.34
(3.66) (3.60) (8.65) (7.05) (8.99) (10.40) (10.27) (10.40) (8.55) (9.17)
Constant -12.74** -15.68** -13.70** -16.62**  -17.30** -18.04** -12.96** -39.26 0.54 -6.93+
(1.88) (1.61) (3.20) (3.12) (3.83) (4.41) (4.65) (806.30) (3.32) (3.93)
N 3676 4471 411 538 1382 1466 896 1106 406 550
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Unclustered standard errors in parentheses. 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest, compared to Distribution of Occupancy Rate in Sample
Marginal Tax Rate <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5% <6.5% >6.5%
50th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.66 0.67 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69
90th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.78
95th percentile of Occupancy Rate Distribution 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.81
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is 
Highest* 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.71 0.26 1.06
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (9) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. 
Total Upper Upscale
Total Upper UpscaleEconomy
Economy
Midscale
Midscale
Upscale
Upscale
Table 9: Organizational Form, Occupancy, and State Marginal Corporate Tax Rate, including Interactions.
Panel A: Estimation Output
Total Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy 32.49** 56.30** 50.29** 0.37 -0.37
(7.60) (17.32) (16.24) (17.32) (17.91)
Occupancy Squared -21.36** -43.85** -34.75** 3.84 1.50
(5.93) (14.03) (12.78) (12.95) (14.39)
Marginal Corporate Tax Rate 5.40 45.61 44.03 -275.60** -57.40
(35.50) (74.93) (81.54) (94.12) (83.90)
Occupancy x Marginal Tax Rate -21.80 -181.9 -189.10 766.00** 140.70
(110.80) (242.70) (256.70) (273.90) (266.50)
Occupancy Squared x Marginal Tax Rate 12.88 182.10 155.00 -589.20** -63.27
(85.85) (195.60) (201.00) (200.90) (211.20)
Constant -14.29** -17.28** -20.06** -4.13 0.12
(2.46) (5.28) (5.17) (5.87) (5.57)
N 8359 1005 3039 2037 985
Brand fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
City fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Unclustered standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Panel B: Occupancy Rate where Predicted Probability of Chain Management is Highest at the 10th and 90th percentile of the State Marginal Corporate Tax Rate Distribution
Total Economy Midscale Upscale Upper Upscale
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest at 10th Percentile 
Tax Rate* 0.76 0.64 0.73 -0.51 0.00
Occupancy Rate where Probability of Chain Management is Highest at 90th Percentile 
Tax Rate* 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.70 1.45
Notes:
The 10th percentile tax rate is 0.003, the 90th percentile tax rate is 0.094.
The coefficient on the marginal corporate tax rate is identified using within-MSA variation where the MSA spans state boundaries.
*This is the occupancy rate at which the first derivative of Equation (10) with respect to occupancy is equal to zero. 
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